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______________ 
 
No. 14-4158 
______________ 
 
DAVID MUNCHINSKI 
 
v. 
 
GERALD SOLOMON, In His Official Capacity as District Attorney  
of Fayette County, Pennsylvania and In His Individual Capacity; 
RALPH WARMAN, In His Official Capacities as First Assistant  
District Attorney and District Attorney of Fayette County, Pennsylvania  
and In His Individual Capacity;  
JOHN A. KOPAS, III, In His Official Capacity as First Assistant District Attorney  
of Fayette County and His Individual Capacity;  
DANA L. FAYOCK, Executrix of the Estate of George Fayock 
 
GERALD SOLOMON; 
RALPH WARMAN, 
Appellants 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01280) 
District Judge: Hon. David S. Cercone 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
 
(Filed:  July 20, 2015) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
 Following his release from prison, David Munchinski sued former Fayette County 
prosecutors Gerald Solomon and Ralph Warman (together, the “Prosecutors”) under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by 
withholding material exculpatory evidence in connection with his murder convictions.  
The Prosecutors moved to dismiss, arguing that they are immune from suit.  The District 
Court denied the motion.  We will affirm.  
I 
A1 
 Munchinski and a co-defendant, Leon Scaglione, were charged with two murders 
in 1982 and tried jointly in 1983.  The jury deadlocked, and Munchinski and Scaglione 
were retried separately in 1986.  At Munchinski’s retrial, the prosecution primarily relied 
on the testimony of Richard Bowen, who claimed to have observed Munchinski and 
Scaglione commit the murders.  Munchinski was convicted and sentenced to two 
consecutive life terms. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are drawn from Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 
F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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 In 1991, Bowen recanted his trial testimony, stating that he had not witnessed the 
murders but was coached by Solomon to say that he had.  Based in part on this 
recantation, Munchinski filed a petition for relief in 1992 under the Pennsylvania Post-
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq.  At an 
evidentiary hearing, Bowen disavowed his recantation, and in 1993, Munchinski’s PCRA 
petition was denied.  He filed two subsequent PCRA petitions, in 2000 and 2001, that 
were also denied. 
 In 1998, Munchinski filed a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The 
District Court denied the petition and we affirmed.  Munchinski v. Price, 254 F.3d 1078 
(3d Cir. 2001).  He filed a second habeas petition in 2007, alleging that the prosecution 
withheld material exculpatory evidence, including evidence that Bowen was not in 
Pennsylvania at the time of the murders.  The District Court granted this petition, 
concluding that Munchinski had demonstrated that the prosecution “suppressed favorable 
evidence that was material to the determination of his guilt or innocence” and thus 
“deprived [him] of a constitutionally-adequate trial.”  Munchinski v. Wilson, 807 F. 
Supp. 2d 242, 290 (W.D. Pa. 2011).  We affirmed and ordered the Commonwealth to 
release Munchinski or retry him.  Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 339 (3d Cir. 
2012).  He was not retried and was released from prison in 2013.   
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B2 
 Munchinski sued the Prosecutors, among others, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming 
that they violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.  He alleges that 
in September 1982, the Prosecutors tape-recorded an interview of Bowen during which 
Bowen denied any involvement in or knowledge of the murders, and that the Prosecutors 
“knowingly failed to preserve” the tape.  App. 39 (Compl. ¶ 24).     
 According to Munchinski, Bowen provided a second statement to the Prosecutors 
roughly one month later in which Bowen claimed, “for the first time,” to have witnessed 
the crimes.  App. 40 (Compl. ¶ 25).  Shortly thereafter, Munchinski was arrested and 
charged.  Munchinski alleges that, based on Bowen’s contradictory statements, the 
Prosecutors could not have reasonably believed that there was probable cause to arrest 
and charge him. 
 Munchinski also alleges that he was wrongfully convicted in 1986 because the 
Prosecutors failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence after the 1983 mistrial.  He 
further alleges that, during the first PCRA proceeding, Warman and another prosecutor 
were ordered to produce for the PCRA court’s in camera review the “complete and 
entire” Pennsylvania State Police investigation file, but failed to do so, and thereby 
withheld material exculpatory evidence.  App. 44 (Compl. ¶ 44).  Munchinski maintains 
that Warman continued to unlawfully withhold this evidence through the denial of his 
                                                 
2 The facts for this section are drawn from the Amended Complaint.  In 
accordance with our standard of review, we assume that they are true. 
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first habeas petition in 2001. 
 The Prosecutors moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that they are entitled to absolute and Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  The District Court denied the motion.  The Prosecutors appeal. 
II3 
A 
We first address whether the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.  As a 
general matter, “state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for 
actions performed in a [judicial or] quasi-judicial role.”  Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 
129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).  “This immunity extends to acts that are ‘intimately associated 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of absolute and Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under the collateral-order doctrine to the extent it turns on issues of law.  
Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2006); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. 
v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993).   
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of absolute immunity, 
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1461 (3d Cir. 1992), and Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Probation & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Because the District Court ruled on the Prosecutors’ immunity arguments 
in the context of denying their motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “[w]e 
apply the same standard that district courts apply at the motion-to-dismiss stage.”  Yarris 
v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, we are “concerned with neither 
the accuracy of the facts alleged nor the merits of [Munchinski’s] underlying claims.”  Id.  
Rather, we must construe the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint in the manner most 
favorable to Munchinski to determine whether the Prosecutors are entitled to immunity 
for any claims based on their alleged misconduct.  Id.; see also Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 
1462-63.  We may also consider “any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the 
claim, items subject to judicial notice, [and] matters of public record.”  Buck v. Hampton 
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’” id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)), but does not encompass “[a] prosecutor’s administrative duties 
and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the 
initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings,” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 
259, 273 (1993).  “Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity 
depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’ 
while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.”  
Yarris, 465 F.3d at 136 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274). 
To determine whether the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity, we must 
examine each of the five acts of misconduct alleged in the Amended Complaint and 
discern whether the Prosecutors were acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial role, or were 
instead performing administrative or investigatory functions.  See Wilson v. Rackmill, 
878 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1989).  At the 12(b)(6) stage, the Prosecutors must 
establish that “the allegations of [Munchinski’s Amended Complaint] . . . indicate the 
existence of absolute immunity as an affirmative defense; the defense must clearly appear 
on the face of the [Amended Complaint].”  Id. at 776; Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 78 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  We address each allegation of misconduct in turn. 
 1.  The Interview Tape 
 Munchinski alleges that the Prosecutors “knowingly failed to preserve” the tape of 
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Bowen’s initial interview.4  App. 39 (Compl. ¶ 24).  While Munchinski fails to specify 
when this knowing failure to preserve the interview tape occurred, he makes this 
assertion in the context of describing the interview itself, which took place in September 
of 1982.  At that time, Munchinski had yet to be arrested or charged.  This suggests that, 
in interviewing Bowen, the Prosecutors had adopted “the detective’s role in searching for 
the clues and corroboration that might give [them] probable cause to recommend that a 
suspect be arrested,” and were thus performing an investigatory rather than a 
prosecutorial function.  Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.  To the extent that their alleged failure 
to preserve the tape occurred in this context, they are not entitled to absolute immunity.5  
Id. (“When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a 
detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, 
immunity should protect the one and not the other.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Therefore, the Prosecutors’ motion to dismiss was properly denied in this respect. 
 2.  The Charging Decision 
Munchinski alleges that the Prosecutors ignored Bowen’s inconsistent interview 
statements and thus could not have reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest 
                                                 
4 The District Court inaccurately characterized the allegation as asserting that the 
Prosecutors destroyed the tape.   
5 To the extent Munchinski intended to allege that the Prosecutors knowingly 
failed to preserve the tape in some other context, we note there are circumstances in 
which prosecutors are not absolutely immune for knowingly failing to preserve 
exculpatory evidence, see Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980), but 
we need not issue a sweeping denial of absolute immunity beyond the allegations as we 
understand them.   
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and charge him.  The arrest of a criminal defendant and the filing of charges are at the 
core of the prosecutorial function, and “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune when 
making [the decision to initiate a prosecution], even where he acts without a good faith 
belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.”  Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Accordingly, the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for this 
conduct.  Id.; see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (holding that a 
prosecutor’s filing of an arrest warrant and charging documents are protected by absolute 
immunity). 
 3.  Disclosures after the 1983 Mistrial 
Munchinski alleges that the Prosecutors withheld material exculpatory evidence 
after his mistrial in 1983 through his retrial and conviction in 1986.  As a general matter, 
prosecutors are “entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence” before and during trial.  Yarris, 465 F.3d at 137.  Such 
immunity does not, however, extend to periods of “judicial inactivity.”  Odd v. Malone, 
538 F.3d 202, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2008) (no absolute immunity for alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct during a four month continuance).  With respect to the lengthy period 
between Munchinski’s April 1983 mistrial and his November 1986 retrial, we are unable 
to determine from the Amended Complaint what transpired, and thus whether the 
Prosecutors “remained ‘intimately associated with [the case’s] judicial phase,’” entitling 
them to absolute immunity, id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430), or assumed a more 
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administrative role, in which case absolute immunity would not attach.  Because the 
immunity defense must be apparent from the face of the complaint, Wilson, 878 F.2d at 
776, we cannot conclude at this stage that the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute 
immunity for this conduct.6   
 4.  Disclosures during the First PCRA Proceeding 
 Munchinski also alleges that, during the first PCRA proceeding, Warman withheld 
material exculpatory evidence by failing to produce the “complete and entire” 
Pennsylvania State Police investigation file for the PCRA court’s in camera review, as 
ordered.  App. 44 (Compl. ¶ 44).  As discussed supra, prosecutors are generally 
absolutely immune for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence before and during trial.  
Yarris, 465 F.3d at 137-38.  To demonstrate entitlement to absolute immunity “[a]fter a 
conviction is obtained,” a prosecutor must show that the alleged misconduct was “part of 
[his] continuing personal involvement as the state’s advocate in adversarial post-
conviction proceedings.”  Id. at 137. 
 Warman directs us to public court records showing that he drafted the answer to 
Munchinski’s petition and brief in opposition to Munchinski’s motion for summary relief, 
and that he participated in hearings.  These records, of which we take judicial notice, see 
In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1995), make clear that he 
                                                 
6 In 1983, the prosecutors were ordered to furnish “all of the evidence” for 
Munchinski’s inspection, App. 76.  Because we lack facts about the order, we will not 
decide whether the Prosecutors’ alleged failure to comply with a 1983 trial court order  
independently precludes the application of absolute immunity.  See Odd, 538 F.3d at 214. 
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was personally involved in the first PCRA proceeding as an advocate such that absolute 
immunity would seem to apply to his failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in 
connection with that proceeding.  See Yarris, 465 F.3d at 137-38.  However, there are 
“few circumstances under which we would consider the act of disobeying a court order or 
directive to be advocative,” and “we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity for 
such disobedience,” Odd, 538 F.3d at 214, particularly where the order allegedly violated 
leaves the prosecutor with little more than “a ministerial function to perform,” Reid v. 
State of N.H., 56 F.3d 332, 336-38 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 Here, the PCRA court ordered Warman to produce “[t]he entire Pensylvania State 
Police investigation file” for its review.  App. 80.  Munchinski alleges that Warman 
failed to do so.  Insofar as the PCRA court’s order did not require Warman to exercise 
any discretion to determine if an item was covered by the order, the order did not require 
the exercise of a prosecutorial function.  Cf. Reid, 56 F.3d at 336-38 (holding that 
prosecutors were absolutely immune for withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of 
a court order because the order was issued in response to a defense motion for “any 
‘exculpatory’ evidence,” and thus required the prosecutors to make judgments).  
Accordingly, Warman is not entitled to absolute immunity at this stage based on his 
alleged violation of the PCRA court’s order and resulting failure to produce material 
exculpatory evidence.  The District Court therefore correctly denied immunity at this 
stage for this conduct. 
 11 
 
 5.  Disclosures after the First PCRA Proceeding 
 Lastly, Munchinski alleges that, following the first PCRA proceeding, Warman 
“continued, post trial, to unlawfully withhold [material] exculpatory evidence” through 
the denial of Munchinski’s first habeas petition in 2001.  App. 46 (Compl. ¶ 52).  While 
the Amended Complaint makes clear that Munchinski continued to collaterally attack his 
conviction after the denial of his first PCRA petition, it does not allege that Warman was 
asked to take any action in connection with or was involved in those proceedings.  The 
Amended Complaint alleges only that Warman “unlawfully” withheld exculpatory 
evidence between roughly 1993 and 2001.  App. 46 (Compl. ¶ 52).   Because the 
Amended Complaint does not allege that Warman was involved in subsequent collateral 
attack proceedings, it is not apparent from its face whether he is entitled to absolute 
immunity for the alleged misconduct following the first PCRA proceeding.  Thus, the 
motion to dismiss on immunity grounds based on this allegation was properly denied. 
B 
 We next address whether the Prosecutors are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment “immunize[s] an unconsenting state from suits 
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.”  
Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Ops., Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658-59 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A suit brought against an actor that is in essence “an arm of 
the state” is similarly barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Id. at 658.  The Eleventh 
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Amendment does not, however, bar suits against officials in their individual capacities, 
even if the actions that are the subject of the suit were part of the officials’ governmental 
duties.  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991).  Since Munchinski has sued the 
Prosecutors in their individual capacities, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply.   
 Moreover, even without considering the individual capacity allegation, the 
Amended Complaint does not demonstrate that the Prosecutors are entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity at this stage.  To determine whether an actor is entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we consider: “(1) the source of funding—i.e., whether 
payment of any judgment would come from the state’s treasury, (2) the status of the 
agency/individual under state law, and (3) the degree of autonomy from state regulation.”  
Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999).  Applying these factors 
requires “a fact-intensive review that calls for individualized determinations.”  Bowers v. 
NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir. 2007).  We treat Eleventh Amendment immunity as 
an affirmative defense, and “the party asserting [it] bears the burden of proving 
entitlement to it.”  Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995). 
From the pleadings, we cannot conclude that the Prosecutors are entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  With respect to the first factor, even if the 
Commonwealth would be required to pay for any judgment Munchinski might obtain, 
this alone is insufficient to grant Eleventh Amendment immunity.  Furthermore, 
“Pennsylvania’s Constitution expressly defines District Attorneys as county rather than 
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state officers.”  Carter, 181 F.3d at 349 (emphasis omitted).  While we do not rule out the 
possibility that the Prosecutors may be able to adduce facts at some later stage in the 
proceedings showing that they are entitled to sovereign immunity notwithstanding this 
fact, see id. at 352-53 (recognizing that the possibility that Pennsylvania District 
Attorneys could be considered state actors to the extent that they are enforcing state law 
and performing other purely prosecutorial duties), such entitlement is not evident on the 
record before us.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying 
the motion to dismiss based on absolute and Eleventh Amendment immunity other than 
with respect to the conduct associated with the charging decision, for which the 
Prosecutors are absolutely immune. 
